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In the Supreme G,ourl of the Slate of Utah
UTAH FUNER,AL DIREtCTO·R.S & EMBALMERS ASBOCIATl'ON, a Utah corporation, on
behalf of its members, and UNION MO·RT·UARY
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, on its own behalf and on behaJlf of others ~similarly ,s.ituated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
-vs.MEMORIAL GARDENS 0'F T'HE VALLE,Y,
INC., a Utah corporation; MEMORIAL TRUSTS,
IN'C., a Utah corporation; LAKE HILLS, a Utah
corporation; AULTOREST MEMORIAL :OORPOR~TION, a Utah corporation; HAL S. BENN.ETT, D'ONALD HACKING AND R.AYM'O·ND
W. GEE, members of the Business Regulation
Commission of the State of Utah; and VIRGIL
L. NORTON, Commi,ssioner orf Insurance of the
State of Utah,
Def erwlants-Respondents.

Case No.
10236

BRIEF OF D'EFENDANT-RESPONDENT
MEMORIAL TRUSTS, IN'C.

Since the primary target of this action was defendant-respondent Memorial Trusts, Inc., herein called Memorial ·Trusts, this brief on its behalf will be directed primarily to the controversy between that corporation and
plaintiffs-appe·llants, herein called plaintiffs.

NAT,URE OF THE CASE
This was an action for declaratory judgment, in
which plaintiffs asked the court to determine that the
contracts of Memorial Trusts, for p-re-arranged funeral
plans, and the conduct and practices utilized in the sale
thereof, were illegal because they conflicted with applicable Utah Statutes.
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D'lS·POSIT'ION IN THE LOWER CO,URT
The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the facts failed to estab~
lish that the contracts in question were illegal or that the
conduct and practices utilized in the sale thereof were in
violation of law and, by its Amended Judgment of Dismissal (R. 44-48), the court granted defendants'·motion to
dismiss the complaint. upon the. further ground that certain portions of the Pre-Arranged Funeral Plan statutes,
Title 22, Chapter 4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (1963
Supplement) are unconstitutional.
PRE.LIMINARY STAT·EMEN·T
In plaintiffs' brief, each of the corporate defendants
IS mistakenly pictured as engaging in essentially the
same business conduct, dealing in essentially the same
products ~nd services and offering prospective purchasers essentially. the same pre-need contracts as are
each of the others. However, a review of the contracts
and practices o~ each readily -reveals their c?ssiinilarities.
(R. 8, 12, 19-20, 35, 39·-41).
Therefore, since the contracts and business practice&
of Memorial ·Trusts differ in most respects from those.
of the other corporate defendants, '\Ve outline in this StateInent of Facts the evidence as it applies to Memorial
·Trusts only and upon '\\"hich the lo,ver court largely based
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its Amended Judgment of Dismissal. No attempt will
be made to discuss or compare the contracts or business
practices of, or the law applicable to, the other corporate
defendants.

STATEME,NT OF FAC·T S
Memorial · T~rusts is a Utah corp·o ration engaged in
selling to the public, in advance of need, contracts for the
furnishing of specified funeral and burial services and
related items of personal p-roperty at fiXed and presently
determinable prices which remain stable, regardless of
future price increases in the industry. ~sale of its contracts is made by means of advertising and personal contact upon reference from person to person. Its contracts
are not sold by door-to-door solicitation. (R. 17)
Memorial :T rusts is not a funeral director or embalmer nor does it carry on any activities related to
such professions. Rather, it merely agrees
"to furnish a casket ... and to cause a completed
funeral to to be conducted (regardless of future
price increases) and including the articles of p-rofessional services and facilities described [in the
contract] below for the final rites of the funeral
purchaser, such services to be performed by a
mortuary selected by the Funeral Purhcaser ... "
(R. 19, paragraph I).
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Further, it is agreed between Memorial Trusts and the
purchaser that
"Memorial Trusts, Inc., as agent for the Fwneral
Purchaser will make firm arrangements with
a mortuary selected by the funeral purchaser. If
a selected mortuary has not accepted the arrangements before the time of the death of the Funeral
Purchaser, or if the Funeral Purchaser's survivors use a mortuary other than one with which the
firm arrangements have been made, then Memorial
Trusts, Inc., may either make arrangements at
the time of death with the mortuary used for like
services or may furnish a casket of the quality described (or refund Memorial ·Trusts' costs thereof)
and refund the sum of $250.00 to the survivors.
in lieu of the funeral services described above,
or may refund all sums paid hereunder to the
survivors." (Emphasis added.) (R.. 19, paragraph V).
With regard to payments made under the contract,.
it is provided that
"the funds to be paid hereunder and the net
earning.s and gains, if any, thereon (altogether
constituting the price of this agreement) shall be
held and disposed of in accordance with the laws
of Utah, from time to time in effect, which now
provide that Memorial Trusts, Inc., shall deposit
such funds as trustee \\yith a bank or trust company. The Funeral Purchaser hereby revocably
appoints J\Iemorial :Trusts, Inc., as agent to demand and receive earnings of the trust funds and
to pay the sa1ne to itsPlf in exchange for and in
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consideration of the agreement of Memorial
Trusts Inc. to guarantee the services and facilities above set forth regardless of future pr1ce
increases. The Funeral Purchaser agrees upon
request to make such demand personally and pay
said earnings to Memorial Trusts, Inc. ( E.mpha.sis
added.) (R. 19, paragraph IV).
'

'

0

Memorial Trusts has made no claim that funds received by it under its contracts are not subject to the
entrusting provisions of the Utah pre-need law and it is
conceded that all funds received by it are, in fact, placed
in trust as provided by that law. (R. 35)
IThe contract also provides that:
"In the event of the death of the Funeral Purchaser before the sums provided for herein are
paid in full, Memorial Trusts, Inc., agrees to perform this agreement upon payment of the balance
remaining due or supplemental arrangements
made therefor." (R. 19, paragraph VI.)
·The contract permits the purchaser to withdraw at
any time all sums paid to Memorial Trusts under the
contract, and thereby terminate all liabilities and ob1igations thereunder. (R. 19, paragraph VII). Further, even
in case of a default in the payments, the purchaser, upon
making a timely request, receives a credit in the amount
paid toward funeral costs at a selected mortuary or toward a new Memorial Agreement (R. 19, paragraph
\TJJI).
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The purpose and effect of the contract thus offered
by Memorial Trusts is to permit the purchaser to make
an unhurried, reasoned selection of the funeral and burial
services and facilities which are to be used upon his
death after having calmly taken into account his own
desires, the prices to be paid and the effect upon his
estate and upon his survivors of each of the various available altenatives.
1

By making his own selection and his own arrangements in advance of need, and by this means fixing the
price in advance as well, a purchaser is able to spare his
widow or other survivors many of the dreary and difficult
tasks of arranging the numerous details of his funeral
and burial. Further, and perhaps most important, a
purchaser of such a contract is able, calmly and with
deliberation, to select funeral arrangements within his
means, secure in the knowledge tha.t his widow and family
will not, under the pressure of deep grief, succumb to
the very human tendency to provide a lavish funeral
service and casket as an expression of their bereavement.
The purchaser, moreover, is able to pay for all or part
of the funeral costs in advance, and thus relieve his
survivors of this substantial financial burden.
Realistically speaking, a plan offering greater benefits and services to a funeral purchaser and his survivors, \vith less risk of loss, \Yould be difficult indeed to
concelVP.
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POIN T I
1

THE LOWER CO·URT PRO~PERLY R1ULE:D T'H!AT A FUNERAL DIRE'CTO,R OR EMBALMER WH·O PERFO·RMS SERVI~CE.S OR FURNISHE;S FACILITIES PURSUA.N T TO· A PRENEED CONTRACT PREVIOUSLY SOLI·CITED AND SOLD BY
MEM~ORI:AL TRUS'DS I1S N·OT GUILTY OF UNETHICAL OR
UN.PROFESSIO·NAL CO·ND:UCT WITHIN THE M~EANING
OF SEICT'I'ONS 58-9-10 and 58-9-22, U.!C.A., 1953, AND THEREBY SUBJECT T10 REVQICATION OF LICENSE.
1

U.'c·.A., 1953, Sections 58-9'-10 and 58-9'-22, related to
unlawful solicitation by licensed funeral directors and embalmers, provide in pertinent part as follows : (All emphasis added.)
58-9-10: "The words 'unprofessional conduct' as relating to embalming are hereby defined
to include:
* * * *
(7) Solicitation of dead human bodies by a
registered apprentice or licensed embalmer or
their agents, assistants or employees, whether ~uch
solicitation occurs before or afteT death * * *

Em:ployment directly or indirectly, of
any apprent~ce, agent * * * or other person, on
part or full time or on commission, for the purpose of calling upon individuals or institutions
by whose influence dead human bodies may be
turned over to .a particular mortuary establ£shment, funeral director or embalmer; provided
(8)
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this provision shall not be deemed to prevent and
prohibit the solicitation for sale of crypts, burial
lots or cremation services by a licensee or his
employee.
58-9-22: "/The words 'unprofessional cortduct' as they relate to this act are hereby defined
to include. * * *

(d) Employment by the licensee of persons
known as 'capers' [cap·p·ers] or 'steerers' or 'solicitors' or other such persons to obtain funeral
directing or embalming business.
(e) Employment, directly or indirectly, of
any apprentice, agent, assistant, embalmer, employee or other person, on part or full time, or on
commission,. for the purpose of calling upon individuals or institutions by whose influence dead
human bodies may be turned over to a particular
funeral director * * *
(f) The buying· of business by the licensee,
his agents, assistants or employees, or the direct
or indirect payment or offer of payment of a
commission, bonus or gift by the licensee, his
agents, assistants or employees for the purpose
of securing business."
These two sections of the Funeral Directors' Act
were designed to eliminate the unse·emly race for dead
human bodies and the many other flagrant abuses and
fraudulent practices 'vhich 'vere once so widespread in the
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unregulated climate of an earlier period. See S·ection 589-13, which sets forth the policy of the law. To this end,
these sections prohibit solicitation activity initiated by
and for the direct benefit of a particular mortuary establishment, funeral director or embalmer, whether acting
in person or through "agents, assistants or employees."
Similarly they prohibit employment of persons to steer
funeral business to them and the "buying of business"
by a "licensee, his agents, assistants or employees" hy
means of a ''direct or indirect payment or offer of payment of a commission, bonus or gift."
The activities and practices proscribed by these sections are set forth clearly and in detail. And no reasonable extension of the quoted language will support plaintiffs' contention that a person or firm which performs
embalming or funeral services, under a pre-need contract
solicited by Memorial Trusts, is guilty of conduct proscribed as unprofessional by those sections of the law.
Under the contract now sold by Memorial T'rusts the
services contracted for are "to be performed by a Mortuary selected by the Funeral Purchaser," provided Memorial Trusts is able to make firm arrangements with
that mortuary "before the death of the Funeral Purchaser."
Under this contract Memorial ·Trusts does not act
as an "agent, assistant or employee" of any "particular
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mortuary establishment, funeral director or embalmer."
'The mortuary used is seleeted by either the purchaser or
his survivors, since the contract gives Memorial Trusts
no right of mortuary selection. Once the selection is made,
it then becomes the task of Memorial Trusts, "as agent
for the Funeral Purchaser," to present the contract to the
mortuary selected for its acceptance or rejection. However, in soliciting the contracts it acts as agent for itself
only, it being at no time either employed, directed or
controlled in any degree whatever by any mortuary, funeral director or embahner.
Such a contract, and the practices followed in it~
sale and performance, conform to the legislative policy
found in Section 58-9-13 and provide a sensible, dignified
and thrifty method by which to solve, in advance of need,
the universal problem of a proper funeral at a proper
pr1ce.
If the Legislature had intended to prohibit sale of
such contracts by organizations such as l\{emorial Trusts,
it could easily have done so but, instead, the language employed in these statutes clearly li1nits their effect.
Significantly, plaintiffs' brief alleges no facts upon
which it may properly be claimed that l\femorial Trusts
1

has engaged in any conduct prohibited by the statutes.,
nor does the record in this case contain any factual basis
for a finding that a mortuary \Yhich accepts and per-
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forms the obligations of a contract sold by Memorial
Trusts has, by such acceptance and performance, violated
the law.
The contention, made at pages 14-16 of plaintiffs'
brief, that when a mortuary agrees to perform as provided in a pre-need contract, the corporate defendant
which sold the contract becomes the agent by ratification
of the mortuary, cannot apply to the contract of Memorial'Trusts. As the cases and authorities relied upon to
support that contention readily show, they deal with
the wholly dissimlar situation where acts are "professed
to be done" on the principal's account by "one not assuming to act for himself," but which acts the principal later
ratifies.
In contrast to the foregoing, the contract of MemorialrT'rusts, as noted above, leaves the mortuary selection
entirely in the hands of the purchaser and/ or his survivors, and reserves no such right to Memorial Trusts.
The arrangements with the mortuary of the purchaser's
choice are then made by Memorial 'T'rusts, not as agent
of the mortuary, but, rather, "as agent for the Funeral
Purchaser" (R. 19).
Certainly the purchaser himself is permitted to contact a mortuary of his choice and make such arrangements in advance of need without violating the above
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statutes related to unlawful solicitation. Similarly, these
same arrangements are permitted to be made by the
purchaser's agent whether it be his wife, his friend, his
employee or Memorial ·Trusts.
Memorial Trusts neither acts, nor assumes to act,
nor has had authority to act as the agent of any mortuary. It acts only on its own behalf and on behalf of
persons who purchase its contracts.
Unsupported allegations of mere legal conclusions
may not be substituted for facts or evidence, especially
where, as here, no attempt whatever was made by plaintiffs to introduce evidence in support of their reckless
and unfounded suspicions of pre-existing agreements
which did not in fact exist. The lower court properly
ruled that it could not assume a violation of law merely
because plaintiffs allege it, particularly where the allegation is, as in paragraph 12 of plaintiffs'

complaint~

base solely on belief and does not even reach the precarious foundation of "information and belief," and the
record itself sho"red a full compliance with applicable
statutes.
Plaintiffs' first ground of summary judgment, therefore, failed and was properly denied.
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P'OINT II
THE LOWER CO,URT PROPERLY RULED T'H,AT THE
~cO·NTRAtCT

PRE-NEED

OF MEMO·RIAL TRUSTS, ArS AT-

TACHED T 0 I'T'S AN18W1E,R AS EXHI,BIT A, WHICH PER1

MITS MEM·ORIAL TRUSTS, AS REV·01CABLE AGENT 01F
THE PAYOR, TO WITHDRAW EARNINGS FR:O,M 'TRUST
DOES NOT VIOLATE 'THE PRO·VI,SIONS 0'F SECTION 224-4, U.C.·A., 1953 (1963

~Supp.)

Section 2.2-4-4, U.1C.A., 1953 ( 1963 Supp.) governs
withdrawal of entrusted funds and provides that:
"All payments and amounts so deposited, with
all earnings and interest thereon, shall not be withdrawn until the death of the sole or one of the
beneficiaries, provided that said funds plus all
interest and earnings shall be release,d to the
payor originally paying sa~d funds under the
purchase agreement, and said payor shall be entitled to receive the same or any part thereof, at
any time prior to the death of any beneficiary,
upon demand upon said bank or trust company,
and upon surrender of any pass book evidencinrJ
same." (Italicized portion was not quoted in appellants' brief, p. 19-20.)
T'his statute does not require that the trust earnings
"can't be withdrawn" as the plaintiffs claim, but rather
that they may be released to the payor at any tin1e, on
demand and surrender of the pass book.
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T·here can be no doubt that under the above statute
the right to control the earnings and interest of the trust
rests in the contract purchaser-the payor. This being
so, there can be no valid objection to the provision in
paragraph IV of the contract of Memorial Ttusts, wherein the payor

". . . revocably appoints Memorial Tirusts, Inc.,
as agent to demand and receive earnings of the
trust funds and to pay the same to itself in exchange for and in consideration of the agreement
. . . to guarantee the services and facilities ...
regardless of future price increases. 'The Funeral
Purhaser agrees upon request to make such demand personally and pay said earnings to ·Memorial T'rusts, Inc." (R. 19) (Emphasis added.)
Nothing in the above statute nor in general law prohibits such disposition of an indivdual's property right by
him or under his direciton.

Nor does any statute or

principal prohibit a person from designating an agent
to act on his behalf in the manner provided in this contract.
"Any person \vho is sui juris and has capacity to affect his legal relations by the giving of
consent to a delegable act or transaction, may authorize an agent to act for him with the same effect as if he \Yere to act in person." 3 Am. Jur.
2d -l-24 (Agency, Section 9).
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Where, as here, the appointment as agent extends
only to the earnings of the trust (and not to withdrawal
of "all funds, including earnings" as alleged by plaintiffs)
and where such appointment can be revoked by the payor
at any time, there is no possibility that the principal fund,
out of which the services and faciilties provided by the
contract are to be paid, will be dissipated or unavailable
when required.
If Section 22-4-4 were construed to prohibit or preclude withdrawal of earnings in this manner, it would
be unconstitutional as an unlawful prohibition of a lawful business under the guise of regulation and an unnecessary, arbitrary and unreasonable restraint upon the right
of all persons to make contracts and deal with their
own properties. The constitutional aspects of the Utah
pre-need law, Sections 22-4-1 to 7, will be discussed more
fully under Point IV, infra, but it is important here to
recall that one of man's basic rights, under our system
of freedom and law, is the right to acquire, usP and dispose of property. As stated by the Supreme Court of
Utah, in Ritholz v. Salt Lake City Corporation (1955 ),
3 Utah 2d 385, 284 P. 2d 702:
'.'·Clearly among the rights attendant upon
ownership and enjoyment of property are the
rights to exchange, pledge, sell or otherwise dispose of it-rights which must be adequately protected."
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It will be noted that in the brief of the defendant
Commissioners, the Attorney ·General concedes that the
Commissioners (after a thorough re·view of this question,
following conferences with representatives of plaintiffs
and of Memorial Trusts) concluded that it had no objection to the business activities, of Memorial Trusts in this
respect.
Plaintiffs again have alleged no fact upon which
to ground their attack upon the contract of this defendant. Again, merely to allege that a contract is improper
does not make it so and plaintiffs' second demand for
summary judgment was therefore properly denied.
POINT III
THE DOWER tCOURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE
PRiE-NEED ·OONTR.A!GT
A CONTRA!GT

O~F

O~F

MEM·ORIAL TR,USTS IS NOT

"INSURANCE," SO AS TO REQUIRE SUB-

MISSTO·N T'O AND COMPLIAN1CE WITH THE UTAH STATUTEIS AND REGULATIO·NS WHICH APPLY TO· INSURAN:OE CO,MP ANIES.

Plaintiffs' contention that Memorial Trusts' pre-need
funeral contract is a "contract of insurance," requiring
Memorial'T'rusts to qualify as an insurance company, is
not supported by either the statutory or the generally
accepted definition or the basic concept of insurance and,
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hence, cannot have the effect urged by plaintiffs. Moreover, as will be shown hereafter, the Utah pre-need
funeral law itself negatives any such contention..
As is stated by the United States Supreme Court in
Helvertng v. LeGierse (1940), 312 U.S·. 531 at 539:
"Historically and commonly insurance involves risk-shifting and risk-distributing. !That life
insurance is desirable from an economic and social
standpoint as a device to shift and distribute risk
of loss from premature death is unquestionable.
That these elements of risk-shifting and risk-distributing are essential to a life insurance contract
is agreed by courts and commentators."
'Typical of many state cases in which this same principle has been restated and applied are In re Barr's
Estate (Calif., 1951), 231 P. 2d 876; In re Smiley's Estate
(Wash., 1950), 216 P. 2d 212, and South Georgia Funeral
Homes, Inc. v. Harrison (Ga., 1936), 188 S.E. 529. In
the latter case the court applied the principle of riskshifting and risk-distribution to pre-need funeral contracts in the following terms :
" ... The contract now being sold by the defendant and by reason of the sale of which this contempt proceeding arose, is one wherein the defendant corporation, for a fixed and definite sum in
hand paid or payable in installments, agrees to
render and perform or cause to be rendered and
performed for the purchaser or any one of his
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family, certain funeral services . . . While the
performance of the contract is contingent upon
death, this in and of itself does not make it a contract of life insurance, nor does the fact that the
fixed sum is payable in· installments. There is
nothing in the contract itself nor is there any evidence to show that the amount paid by a purchaser
is less than the value of the funeral services contracted to be performed, or that there is any
element of risk involved, either on the part of the
purchaser or the defendant corporation. The contract on its face does not appear to be one of
life insurance."
The conclusions drawn above were referred to by
Justice 1Crockett in his concurring opinion in In re Clark's
Estate (Utah, 1960), 10 Utah 2d 427, 354 P.2d 112, in
which he was joined by Justice McDonough. In that
opinion he noted at page 118-119 that:
" ... the important and controlling fact [is]
that the financing institution, Equitable, incurred
no risk of loss in the event of Mr. Clark's death.
It was obliged to pay nothing except to refund
the payments he has made ... plus interest thereon .... From the facts above discussed it seems
quite unmistakable that the contract ... does not
have the characteristics to properly classify it
as a contract for life insurance.
" 'Insurance' is an agreement that, for a
premiu1n it receives, the insurer will pay to the
beneficiary a stated sum upon the happening of
a contingency such as death or other loss. It
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involves risk on the part of the insurer to pay
on the happening of the contingency and the
spreading of the risk over the group who pay
the premiums. Or, as is sometimes stated, 'insurance involves risk-shifting .and risk-distributing.'"
The concurring opinion concludes with this approving reference to a decision of the Supreme Court of
New Jersey (In Re Atkin's Estate 18 A.2·d 45) 1n an
annuity case:
"!The court placed emphasis on the fact that
. the company assumed no risk of loss by
reason of the premature death of the annuitant,
and that its only risk was in case . . . [he·] lived
longer than expected. It reasoned in accordance
with the views exp-ressed above that because
there was no risk-shifting or risk-distributing
... but simply a return of the accumulated payments upon the death of the employee, that the
fund was not life insurance. ·The Supreme Court
of the United States similarly reasoned to the
same conclusion in the case of Helvering v. LeGierse."
After the Clark case was decided, the Utah Legislature, in 1963, changed the definition of "insurance" to
include the conc~pt . of "risk." Formerly, the statute
provided that insurance was " . . . a contract whereby
one undertakes to pay indemnity or pay a specified
amount upon determinable contingencies," but the 1963
amendment added the word "risk" to the last phrase,
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so it now reads ". . . upon determinable risk contingencies," S·ection 31-1-7, u~c·.A., 19~53, (1963, Supp.).
( E·mphasis added.)
·The addition of the word "risk" to the statute,
which plaintiffs have completely overlooked in their
brief, makes even more compelling the conclusion that
the risk features must be present in any contract for it
to constitute insurance.
Applying the principle of the autl1orities above
cited to the contract issued by Memorial ·T-rusts, it is apparent that it cannot he properly classified as insurance.
The following features of that contract are particularly
illustrative of the point :
1. The contract price to be paid by the purchaser,
although payable in installments if the purchaser chooses,
is, nonetheless, fixed in amount. In the event any balance on the contract remains unpaid at the death of
the purchaser or the person for ·w·hom the services are
to be perfor1ned, the services contracted for will be
performed only "upon payment of the balance remaining due" or upon "supplemental arrangements" being
made for such paYJ.nent. Thus, the contract contains
no

~'forgiveness"

feature whereby 1\Jfemorial Trusts as

sumes a risk of incomplete pay1nent because of premature death. The amount due l\femorial T·rusts under
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each contract, either from the purchaser, his estate or
from others, is fixed when the contract is entered into
just as with any installment contract.
2. The contract is fully revocable, at any time while
it is in effect, at the opinion of the purchaser, in which
event all amounts paid by him under the contract must
be refunded to him.
3. 'The contract requires 1Iemorial Trusts to place
in trust all funds received from the purchaser, it being
entitled to no solicitation expenses or commissions of any
kind whatever from that fund until the services contracted for have been performed. In the meantime, the earnings received from the trust constitute the compensation
to Memorial T'rusts for guaranteeing the services regardless of future p·rice increases.
'Thus, insofar as Memorial Trusts is concerned,
each individual contract stands on its own so that all
services offered by Memorial Trusts at any given time
are equally available to any would-be purchaser at the
same prices, regardless of the age, condition of health,
financial status or moral qualifications of the purchaser
or the person for whom the services are to be furnished.
In this conection it is important to note that Memorial
Trusts neither uses nor has need to use mortality tables,
risk percentage calculations, physical examinations or
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signed health application forms which are so common
in the insurance field. Instead, the same serVIces are
available to all take-rs at the same prices.
4. By virtue of Section 22-4-5, "any balance remaining not otherwise disposed of ... in payment for merchandise or services" as provided in the pre-need contract
" ... shall revert to and inure to the benefit of the estate
of said decease·d payor.... "thus precluding any possible
"risk" as to the amount of gain, if any, on even that
possible small surplus.
When and if the contract matures, Memorial T;rusts
is entitled to its commission and profit, and in the meantime, for so long as the contract remains in force, M.emorial 'TTusts is entitled to the earnings from the trust .
·T·herefore, it makes no difference as to any contract
whether death comes early or late. These contracts
contain none of the risk-shifting or risk-distributing
features of insurance contracts. Each is a separate, selfcontained unit with no risk ties to any othe-r.
·The cases and authorities cited in plaintiffs' brief
as supporting their contention that pre-need contracts
constitute insurance are not applicable to the contract
of Memorial'Trusts. Each of those cases and authorities
either deals with a situation in which the risk-distributing, risk-shifting features are clearly present or they
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rely upon cases in which those elements were dominant.
None of them have analyzed in detail nor involved a
contract such as that sold by ~1emorial Trusts.
Apparently the most recent case to decide this
question is Messerli v. Monarch Memory Gardens (Idaho), 397 P.2d 34, decided November 25, 19'64. In that
case the contracts under challenge permitted the purchaser to have any balance of the purchase price which
remained unpaid upon his death paid from proceeds of
credit life insurance, but only until the purchaser reached
65 years of age and only so long as he remained in "good
health." ·The contract also obligated the seller to provide
an interment space for any of the purchaser's four
grandchildren in the event they died before reaching age
21.
The statutory definition of insurance in Idaho, Idaho
Code Section 41-102, is identical to S·ection 31-1-7, U.'C.A.
1953 (1963 Supp.).
Notwithstanding these provisions in that contract
which distinguish it from and which make it more like
insurance than, the contracts sold by Memorial 'Trusts,
the Idaho court held, in a majority opinion by Justice
McFadden, that the contract was not a contract of insurance but, rather, a contract for the purchase of services and merchandise, with delivery postponed until
after death. The court there, in so ruling, carefully out-
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lined the features which distinguish a contract of insurance and noted, as we have above, that the cases and
authorities in which pre-need contracts have been held
to be insurance are distinguishable from the facts of the
present case which do not involve the elements of riskshifting and risk-distributing.
Quite apart from the foregoing, the conclusion that
these contracts do not constitute insurance is compelled
by the pre-need funeral law itself. It will be noted that
in plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, this Court
is requested to declare that ~ny:
" ... pre-need contract which guarantees funeral services at a future date at a set price regardless of increase or deerease in price is an insurance contract." (R. 32)
This request must be compared with the language
of Section 22-4-1 ( 1963 Supp.) which sets out the scope
of activities which are governed by the Utah pre-need
funeral law as follows :
" . . . any payment of money made to any
person, firm or corporation upon any agreement
or contract . . . which has for a purpose the
furnishing or performance of funeral services,
under a pre-arranged funeral plan ... for future
use at a time determinable by the death of the
person or persons for "\vhose benefit any such
agreement has been made ... shall be held to be
trust funds ...."
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and their receipt, deposit and use are governed by the
remaining provisions of Chapter 4, Title 22.
1

As is readily apparent from the quoted excerpts,
the plaintiffs seek to have regulated as "insurance" all
of the plans, persons and practices which are necessarily
already included within the scope of the pre-need fune-ral
law. However, there is no need and no reason for qualification under, and compliance with, both the pre-need
law and the insurance code at the same time. In recognition of this fact Section 22-4"""6 (1963 Supp.) of the preneed law provides :
"!This act shall not apply to or affect the
operations and business of duly licensed associations or companies under the insurance laws of
the state of Utah."
Were all pre-need funeral contracts to be treated as
insurance contracts and required to comply with the
State Insurance ~Code, as the plaintiffs so strongly
contend, the pre-need law itself would be rendered meaningless because there would remain nothing to which it
would apply, in view of the exclusion contained in Section 22-4-6 for duly licensed insurance companies and
associations. This simply cannot have been the intent
of the Legislature, which went to the trouble of enacting
a special law for a special kind of contract.
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Under the construction urged by Memorial 'Trusts,
only true insurance companies which have complied with
the insurance code and which coincidentally deal in some
fashion with pre-need funeral plans and arrangements
would be excluded from the operation of the pre-need
funeral law. ,c·ompliance with the insurance laws as an
insurer is sufficient protection of the public interest
without requiring compliance with the pre-need law in
addition. :This arrangement leaves the great majority
of pre-need funeral contracts fully regulated under the
pre-need funeral law, as they should he and as the
L·egislature obviously intended them to be.

THE LO·WER COURT PRO!PERLY RULED THAT CER-

1

TAIN POR:TTONS OF 8EiCTIO·NS 22-4-1 TO 6 AND ALL
OF SECTI0 N 7, U.'C.A. 1953 (19'63 SUPPLEMENT), ARE
1

UNiGONSTITIONAL

UNDER

THE

UNIT'ED

STATES

OONSTITUTIO·N OR THE ·CONSTIT'UTION O·F UTAH.

'The Utah pre-need funeral law, Section 22-4-1 to
7, U.C.A. 1953 (196.3 Supp.), when considered as a whole
is unconstitutional in that it:
(1) makes every "person who violates any
provision" of the act guilty of a criminal violation
and subject to criminal penalties, without at the
same tilne giving notice or otherwise informing
those subject to the act what conduct on their part
renders them liable to its penalties;
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(2) singles out and discriminates against a

particular lawful business, thereby denying equal
protection of the laws to Memorial :Tirusts and
others similarly situated; and
(3) imposes unnecessary arbitrary and unreasonable prohibitory restrictions upon lawful
private business transactions under the guise of
regulation in the puhlic interest.
These deficiencies will be discussed In the above
order.
(1) Contained within the seven sections of the pre-

need law are literally dozens of requirements with which
the persons named in the act must comply. To impose
punishment upon any person who violates "any provision" of the act, whether willful or not, and without regard to the nature or purpose of the violation, is violative
of due process. For example, suppose the trustee should
fail to furnish all "information required by the director"
(Section 22-4-3) or, through oversight, omit a date or
an amount on a required report? Are such acts and
omissions crimes~ How is a reasonable man to distinguish between criminal and non-criminal violations?
A smilar situation was before the ·Colorado Supre1ne

Court in Memorial Trusts, Inc. v. Beery ('C.olo. 1960),
356 P.2d 884, wherein a similar statute was declared to
be unconstiutional for vagueness. In that case, as in the
present one, "violations of the act (were) ... made punishable by fine or imprisonment."
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The court in that case stated at p. 888 :
"'T'he test to which the statute in question
must be subjected under this record is made clear
by the ~Supreme C'ourt of the United ·States in the
case of 'Connally v. General Construction Co., 269
u.s. 385....
1

'That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit
to inform those who are subject to it what
conduct on their part will render them liable
to its penalties is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions
of fair play and the settled rules of law, and
a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application
violates the first essential of due process of
law."
"·T'he statute in the particulars hereinabove
mentioned is violative of due process and is unconstitutional (under the United States and Colorado
~Constitutions)."

The same test is reiterated by the Supreme 'Court of
the United States in the recent case of Baggett v. Bullitt
( 1964) ______ U.S. ______ , 12 L.Ed.2d 377.
In State v. Musser (Utah 1950), 118 Utah 537, 223
P.2d 193, the Utal1 Supren1e Court voided and held un-
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constitutionally vague a statute which made it a criminal
offense for two or more persons to conspire "to commit
any act injurious . . . to public morals. . . ." And in
State v. Packard (Utah 1952), 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2·d
561 the ,c·ourt held unconstitutional a statute which
'
prescribed
criminal penalties for failure to register with
the Industrial~Commission before "commencing employment with any person, firm or corporation whose employees are out on a labor strike called by a national
recognized union." In that case the Utah court set out
the standards which a statute must meet to withstand
an attack on the ground that it is vague and uncertain.
"The limitations of language are such that
neither absolute exactitude of expression nor complete precision of meaning are to be expected,
and such standard cannot be required. On the
other hand there is no disagreement among the
courts that where a rule is set up, the violation
of which subjects one to criminal punishment, the
restrictions upon conduct should be prescribed
with sufficient certainty, so that persons of ordinary intelligence, desiring to obey the law, may
know how to govern themselves in conformity with
it, and that no one should be compelled at the
peril of life, liberty or property, to speculate as
to the meaning of penal statutes.
"'Concerning the question of uncertainty or
vagueness of statutes, the authorities seem to be
in accord with the test a statute ntust need to be
valid is : It must be sufficiently definite (a) to
inform persons of ordinary intelligence, who would
be law abiding, "\vhat their conduct must be to
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conform to its requirements ; (b) to advise- a
defendant accused of violating it just what constitutes the offense with which he is charged, and
(c) to be susceptible of uniform interpretation
and application by those charged with responsibility of applying and enforcing it."
It is submitted that the pre-need law, insofar as it
prescribes criminal penalties for violations of its terms,
meets none of the tests set forth in the Packard case.
The act states that any person who violates "any provision'' of the act is guilty of a criminal offense. Yet
the act requires, as to each and every pre-need contract
that comes within its terms, compliance with a complex
system which involves entrusting of funds and submission of reports within prescribed periods of time over
the entire life of the contract which may encompass many
years' time. As to reports, there is no determinable limit
upon the phrase "all information required by the director.''
Certainly no one would argue that every single act,
duty and responsibility involved in this complicated
scheme, such as dotting of the i's and crossing of the t's
in the required reports might subject a person to the
criminal penalty unless done correctly, on time and to
the extent and "rith the detail required by the director,
whose requirements n1ight change as often as men change
their 1ninds. If such ''rere the ease, the statute would surely be deelared void as an unreasonable exercise of the
pollee po\\'"Pr. \"" <:)t the statute dra"\\'"S no line e~cluding
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these insignificant acts or omissions from its operation or
defining the nature and extent of the information which
a direetor might require. No person governed by the
statute can act, except at his peril, if the p·enalty provision is to be uniformly enforced. Moreover, no person
charged with its enforcement could possibly give it uniform interpretation and application. As the United
States Supreme ;Court stated in Manley v. The State of
Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 73 L.E·d. 575, 578 in striking down
as unconstitutional a statute which provided criminal
penalties for certain conduct of officers of a bank, "the
statute does not specify the elements of the offense."
In contrast, to the Utah provision, the Idaho statute,
Idaho Code Section 54-1120, upheld in Messerli v. Monarch Memory Gardens, Inc., supra, provides that only
"willful'' violations of the act are criminal offenses.
(2) It is a well-established principle of law that

a lawful business may not be unreasonably singled out
for unduly stringent or oppressive restriction under the
guise of regulation without violating the state and federal
constitutional provisions which guarantee equal protection of the laws. !Thus in State v. Memorial Gardens
Development Corp. (W. Va. 1957), 101 S·.E. 2d 425, 68
A.L.R. 2d 1233, the court heid unconstitutional and void
as singling out and discriminating against an other\vi HP
lawful business and as discriminating between kinds
and classes of businesses, a statute very similar to tht'
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Utah pre-need law with which the present case is concerned. That statute required that all funds collected
upon pre-need burial contracts be deposited in trust
accounts for the benefit of policyholders and withdrawn
only upon the death or demand of the purchaser, with
the result that no money was available to the trustor
for operating expense or profit. !The court noted that:
"Many frauds are perpetrated in daily business transactions and redress therefor is civilly
and criminally available to the victim. But fraud
is not necessarily or reasonably imputable to
the business of selling personal property or agreeing to perform services whether at present or
in the future. If such were the law, every merchant could be regulated in the simple sale of his
goods. . . . While it may be true that the defendant's business is not that simple, yet the quantity
or extent of business conducted or the time of
performance element should not be the criterion
by which legality is determined."
As the Utah Supreme Court has stated in W allberg
v. Utah Public Welfare C-ommission (Utah, 1949), 115

Utah 242, 203 P.2d 935, 940:
"/The law is well established that the legislature has authority, within constitutional limitations, to make classifications when and only when
the classifications rests upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the subject of the legislation.
* * *
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"iTo be unconstitutional, the discrimination
must be unreasonable and arbitrary."
As is pointed out in the Memorial Gardens case,
supra, there is no reasonable basis upon which the oppressive control and regulation imposed by the Utah
pre-need law can be justifiably imposed upon pre-need
funeral contracts when no other similar merchandising
activity is subjected to such a stifling degree of control.
The furnishing of funeral services is as old as civilization and as necessary as life itself. ~There is no rational
basis upon which the activity of providing payment for
those services in advance of need should be single·d out
and so severely restricted.
(3) ·The most serious constitutional violation perpetrated by the pre-need law is its unreasonable and arbitrary restriction of a lawful business, amounting to a
prohibition, under the guise of regulation in the public
interest. The distinction between illegal prohibition of
a business and its lawful regulation in the public interest
has been clearly pointed out in numerous cases, including
decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court of Utah. As these cases show, the restrictions contained within the Utah pre-need law amount
to an unconstitutional prohibition of the sale of preneed contracts rather than their lawful regulation.
1

In New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann (1932), 285 U.S.
261, 76~L~.Ed. 747, it is stated:
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''Plainly, a regulation which has the effect
of denying or unreasonably curtailing the common
right to engage in a lawful private business, such
as that under review, cannot be upheld consistent
with the 14th Amendment. Under that amendment, nothing is more clearly settled than that
it is beyond the poweT of a state, 'under the guise
of protecting the public, arbitrarily [to] interfere
with private business or prohibit lawful occupations or impose unreasonable and unnecessary
restrictions upon the·m.' "
" ... the principle is embedded in our constitutional system that there are certain essentials
of liberty with which the state is not entitled to
dispense in the interest of experiments."
Similarly, in Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial
Relations (1924), 267 U.S·. 550, 69 L.Ed. 785, the Court observed:
" ... While there is no sueh thing as absolute
freedom of contract, and it is subject to a variety
of· restraints, they must not be arbitrary or unreasonable. Freedom is the general rule and restraint the exception. The legislative authority
to abridge can be justified only in exceptional
circumstances. . . ." ''The established doctrine is
that this liberty (of contract and right of property) may not be interfered \vith under the guise
of protecting the public interest, by legislative
action \Yhich is arbitrary or \vithout reasonable
relation to some purpose \Vithin the co1npetency
of the state to effect.' ,,
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In Baltimore and O.S.W.R. Company v. Voigt (1899),
176 U.S. 498, 44 L.Ed. 560, the court quoted a leading
English case as follows :
·"It must not be forgotten that you are not
to extend arbitrarily those rules which say that
a given contract is void as being against pulic
policy, because if there is one thing which more
than another public policy requires it is that
men of full age and competent understanding
shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and
that their contracts when entered into freely and
voluntarily shall be held sacred, shall be enforced by courts of justice. Therefore, you have
this paramount public policy to consider - you
are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of
contract."
The same court said in Adams v. Tarnner (1916),
244 U.S. 590, 61 L.Ed. 1336:
C·ertainly there is no profession, possibly
no business, which does not proffer peculair opportunities for reprehensible practices; and as to
every one of them, no doubt, some can be found
quite ready earnestly to maintain that its suppression would be in the public interest. Skillfully directed agitation might also bring about
apparent condemnation of any one of them by
the public. Happily for all, the fundamental
guarantees of the constitution cannot be freely
submerged if and whenever sorne ostensible
justification is advanced and the police power invakeel."
"

1
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And, it is stated in Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S.
418, 171 L.Ed. 718:
"It is not permissible to enact a law which in
effect spreads an all-inclusive net for the feet of
everybody upon the chance that, while the innocent will surely he entangled in its meshes,
some wrong-doers also may be caught."
T'he above principle-s were recognized by the Supreme 1Court of Utah in Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake
(Utah, 1956), 3 Utah 2d 385, 284 P.2d 702 at 706, wherein an ordinance which prohibited advertising of the
prices of eyeglasses was held unconstitutional. ·The
court said:
"It should be noted that the law cannot be made,
nor could one be enforced, which would entirely
protect the completely naive and gullible. In
any event, if a customer desires to use ordinary
care, adequate protection is afforded. ...
"'There are also other considerations to be
taken into account as against the contention made
by the city that the ordinance would tend to insure
better quality of eyeglasses and conserve public
health. One of these is that the basic theory underlying our system of government, its laws and
our entire social system, is that all persons shall
enjoy the highest possible degree of individual
freedom consistent with the same de·gree of liberty
in others, which theory this restriction upon plaintiffs' business runs counter to. Another is the
effect which free competition ... has upon busi-
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ness. Such freedom in competition has proved
very beneficial to our economy and our standard
of living. Its stimulus has resulted in p·roducing
ever more efficient methods by which the American people have been furnished more and better
services and higher quality merchandise. ·They
have proved themselves sufficiently good judges
of the quality of products that those who excel
in furnishing superior ones succeed and continue
to improve, while others fail.
'·';The very element of competition through
price advertising may well have beneficial effects
upon the quality of the product sold which would
offset any possible slight detriment to health that
may be hazarded if such advertising were curtailed. . . . We are of the opinion that it (the
ordinance) does not have any such substantial
bearing on public health as to justify this extension
of the police power into the regulation of private
business and the violation of the right to freely
advertise and sell one's property. We do not
believe that the constitutional rights involved
should be swept away on any such tenuous ground
... the evil sought to be corrected by the ordinance
is a business evil. The ordinance has no relation
to public health and is an unlawful interference
with private business. It is also parallel with the
principle espoused by this Court in the case of
Salt Lake City v. Revene, in which we deerePrl the
ordinance fixing opening and closing hours of
barber shops to have no substantial relationship
to public health .... "
In State v. M emoria.Z Gardens Development Corp.,
cited supra, a statute nearly identical to the Utah pre-
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need law was declared to be unconstitutional as being
prohibitory rather than regulatory, the court there statIng:
Although plaintiff claims that the public dealing with defendant could be defrauded, such possibility should not destroy the right to contract.
Fear or suspicion that one will commit fraud or
resort to fraudulent practices can be leveled at
any one at any time engaged in any lawful business, but we hardly see where that should be the
basis for either regulation or prohibition of legitimate business. :The state cannot possibly protect
all its citizens against possible loss on contracts
which parties make.
* * *
·"The statute here involved which requires
impounding of all purchase money has prohibitory rather than regulatory effect, because no
one could without other types of business or finances afford to engage in such business which
allowed no expenditure of the funds for operational expenses."
Similarly, in State v. Gateway ~fortuaries (l\1ont.
1930), 287 Pac. 156,. the court held void and unconstitutional a statute which prohibited written contracts for
personal services in connection \Vi th burial of human
bodies, when not 1nade in contemplation of immediate
death. ~The court noted that the mere possibility of
fraud was insufficient ground for prohibiting a la\Yful
business. Said the court:
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"The moving impulse is not to regulate business; it is to prohibit written contracts relating
to the very essentials of the business, except under
circumsta.nces practically prohibitive . .. to the
general rwn of mankind." (Emphasis added.)
Although the Utah Legislature, by enacting the preneed law, seemingly declared pre-need contracts to be
legitimate and useful, nevertheless it condemned them
by the oppressive and unreasonable control to which
it subjected them. In this respect the Utah pre-ne·ed law
is similar to that stricken down as an unconstitutional
prohibition in Gardon Spot Market, Inc. ·v. Byrne (Mont.,
1962), 378 P.2d 220.
As pointed out above, there is no inherent characteristic of pre~need funeral contracts which makes them
more subject to fraud or overreaching than numerous
other merchandising enterprises. Yet these contracts
are subjected to far more stringent controls than are
imposed upon any other merchandising activity in 1Ttah.
Especially restrictive is the requirement that all funds
paid on such contracts, including· all commissions and
profit to the seller, be placed in trust until the death
of the purchaser, which in many cases does not occur
until many years after the contract becomes operative.
Simimlarly restrictive is the provision which permits the·
purchaser to withdraw impounded trust funds at any
time without paying any of the expense of administration
of sales.
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:These restrictions, in practical effect, serve to prohibit the selling of these contracts except by persons and
concerns with large reserves and, even then, only under
great financial handicap. And the addition of the allinclusive penalty provision makes this activity even yet
more prohibitory and precarious.
The extent to which the Utah pre-need law circumscribes and prohibits a person from dealing with and
disposing of his own property becomes apparent when
it is realized that is absolutely and categorically prohibits a person from making a present, binding commitment of his own money for the future disposition of his
own body. Thus, a person is unable under the act to
set aside out of his own reach and the reach of his
creditors even a small amount of his present income or
savings to provide for a decent burial when he dies, so
as to avoid having to depend upon charity or upon surviving relatives in the event financial reverses or ill
health deplete his assets before his death. By the terms
of. the statute all sums paid by him, though in trust,
belong to him and can be withdrawn by him at any time.
T·he act creates a simple debtor-creditor relationship
between the purchaser and the bank and the seller has
no claim upon the money until the purchaser's death.
Thus the purchaser is not immune from the vicissitudes
of fortune which may require that he take out and use
the resources which are available to him. And, so long
as he is able to reach the funds \Vithout restriction they
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are also subject to being taken away by his creditors.
Indeed, even a transfer to his son upon the son's promise
to use the funds for the father's burial would fall within
the scope and control of the Utah pre-need law so as
to require the son to entrust all sums so received and, at
the same time, subject them to the tides of fortune and
health as noted above. Certainly this degree of control
cannot be justified on the pretext of "protecting" the
citizens' best interests.
If the Utah pre-need law is considered as a whole,
and its many restrictive features carefully analyzed,
it becomes apparent that it was conceived and initiated
by established concerns of which plaintiffs are repre ..
sentatives, who were and are interested in perpetuating
existing conditions which permit them to exercise a
virtual monopoly over the funeral business in Utah with
out fear of competition from concerns such as Memorial
T'rusts which seek to offe-r the purchaser a valuable
service at reasonable prices.
Because of the severe restrictions imposed by th<~
pre-need law, numerous persons, who would otherwisP
be able to plan their funeral needs and pay for them over
a period of time in an atmosphere conducive to rational
deliberation, are required instead to pass these problP1ns
on to their survivors who, under the influence of grj pf
and the pressure of time, cannot calmly and quietly select
those funeral arrangements which they can afford.
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Instead, while in deepest mourning and in profound
shock, they agree to pay sums far beyond their means,
in a vain effort to compensate in death for what they may
have failed to provide the deceased in life. In this, they
are smoothly supported by the expensive suggestions
of the sympathetic and knowledgable funeral director,
whose gentle pressure results in contracts for services
and merchandise far beyond the means and budget
of the bereaved.
Such practices have furnished the basis for numerous recent magazine articles and books. An authoritative
survey and analysis of the problem, in which the prevalence of the practice is discussed at some length, is
contained in the May, 1963 Stanford Law Review, page
425, with the article: "Pre-Arrangement: Mitigating the
Undertaker's Bargaining Advantage."
CONCLUSIO·N
'T·he contracts and practices of Memorial Trusts
conform to the law and no one who accepts and performs
such contracts is guilty of improper conduct.
Memorial ·T'rusts is not in the insurance business and
1s not required to be regulated as an insurer, since its.
contract does not contain the statutory or decisional
elements of insurance ..
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The pre-need concept is a valuable development in
a business and profession which all must inevitably
patronize. ·This development, however, is being slowly
and effectively strangled in its infancy by an arbitrary,
vague and unconstitutional enactment of the Utah Legislature- the Pre-Arranged Funeral Plan L~aw.
It is therefore clear that plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was properly denied by the lower court
and this Court should declare unconstitutional and void
those portions of the Utah pre-need law, Sections 22-4.-1
to 7, U.C.A., (1963 Supp.) which provide: (All emphasis added.)
1. (Section 22-4-1) "Any payment of money
made to any person ... for ... the furnishing or
performance of funeral services, under a prearranged funeral plan, or the furnishing or delivery of awy personal property, merchandise or
services of any nature ... in connection with the
final disposition of a dead human body, for
future use ... shall be held to be trust funds .... "

2. (Section 22-4-2) "All such trust funds shall
be deposited in the name of the trustee, as trustee
... and shall be held in trust, subject to the provisions of this act."
. 3. (Section 22-4-3) "All such reports ( required by the act) shall set forth in detail the
information contained in the records required
~o be kept by the trustee aforesaid, plus any other
Information required by the director.
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"All payments and
amounts so deposited, with all earnings and interest thereon, shall not be withdrawn ... provided that said funds plus all interest and earnings shall be released to the payor originally paying said funds ... at any time prior to the death
of any beneficiary upon demand upon said bank
or trust company.... n
4. (S.ection

22-4-4)

5. All of S·ection 22-4-7.
By so doing, Memorial ·T'rusts and other reputable
concerns will be able to provide a sensible pre-need plan
for the public while at the same time putting an end
to the undesirable practices which plaintiffs in their
selfish interest, seek to perpetuate by this suit.
Respectfully

submitt~d,

JO~HN

H. SNO·W
701 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake 1City, Utah
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
Memorial Trusts, Inc.
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